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The New Data Marketplace: Protecting
Personal Data, Electronic
Communications, and Individual Privacy
in the Age of Mass Surveillance Through a
Return to a Property-Based Approach to
the Fourth Amendment
by MEGAN BLASS*
I. Mass Surveillance in the New Millennium: Edward Snowden
Versus The National Security Agency
A. Watergate Fears Realized: National Security Agency Programs
Exposed in 2013
Edward Snowden is now a household name.' He garnered global
attention in 2013 when he claimed responsibility for leaking
government documents that revealed unprecedented levels of
domestic surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency
("NSA" or "the Agency"). 2 The information leaked by Mr. Snowden
was just the tip of the iceberg. Since the initial leaks in June 2013,
government documents have been unsealed, lawsuits have been filed,
and alarming information about National Security Agency
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This
Note is dedicated to Angelique Davis, Esq., Associate Professor, Department of Political
Science, Seattle University for her inspirational scholarship and leadership, dedication to
social justice, and unwavering support.
1. John Cassidy, Snowden's Solution: More Encryption, Better Watchdogs, NEW
YORKER (March 10, 2014), available at http://www.newyorker.com/onlineblogs/john
cassidy/2014/03/snowdens-solution-more-encryption-and-better-watchdogs.html.
2. See Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Edward Snowden Comes
Forward as Source of National Security Agency Leaks, WASH. POST (June 9, 2013),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-on-
leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-1le2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html.
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surveillance has continued to come to light.3 The 2013 leaks resulted
in public outcry and calls for action from both sides of the political
aisle.'
While discussion over the intelligence gathering programs
administered by the National Security Agency exploded in 2013,
concern over domestic spying is hardly a recent phenomenon.' As
early as 1975, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, members of
Congress were concerned about the National Security Agency's
intelligence gathering programs.6 Even then, members of Congress
feared that the National Security Agency's intelligence gathering
programs would be turned towards United States citizens and used in
domestic spying operations.7 Almost forty years later, such fears have
come true. The 2013 leaks generated more questions than answers.
What remains true is that the constitutional and regulatory
framework governing personal data and electronic communications
needs an overhaul. In an era of intrusive domestic surveillance,
individuals should own property rights in their personal data and
electronic communications in order to receive the protection they are
truly entitled to under the Fourth Amendment.
3. See Timeline of National Security Agency Domestic Spying, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline (last visited Jan. 30,
2015); NSA Files: Decoded, GUARDIAN, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/i (last
visited Apr. 7, 2014); EDWARD C. Liu, ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 8 (2014) (reviewing
several instances of recent litigation over NSA surveillance).
4. Frank Newport, Americans Disapprove of Government Surveillance Programs,
GALLUP (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/163043/americans-
disapprove-government-surveillance-programs.aspx.
5. Timeline of National Security Agency Domestic Spying, supra note 3.
6. The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearings Before
the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong. 1-3 (1975).
7. "We have a particular obligation to examine the NSA, in light of its tremendous
potential for abuse. It has the capacity to monitor the private communications of
American citizens without the use of a 'bug' or 'tap.' The interception of international
communications signals sent through the air is the job of NSA; and, thanks to modern
technological developments, it does its job very well. The danger lies in the ability of the
NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications." Id. at 2.
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B. The National Security Agency is Collecting an Unprecedented
Variety and Quantity of Personal Data, Virtual Information, and
Electronic Communications
The National Security Agency conducts so much domestic
surveillance that it would be easier to answer the question "what isn't
the National Security Agency collecting" than to detail every facet of
the Agency's intelligence gathering programs.' Recently, its PRISM
and XKeyscore programs garnered notoriety. Through these
programs, the National Security Agency has collected massive
amounts of personal data and information, including the contents of
e-mails, stored data, and internet traffic.9 Even without PRISM and
XKeyscore, the National Security Agency collects more than 250
million internet communications each year." Moreover, even the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the tremendous capability of the
government to conduct this surveillance."
1. PRISM
PRISM was one of the NSA programs revealed by Edward
Snowden.12 The PRISM program is a form of indirect surveillance
that involves the NSA working with various internet-based service
providers, including Google, Apple, and Facebook, to collect user
8. The answer to that question, by the way, is not much.
9. See National Security Agency slides explain the PRISM data-collection program,WASH. POST (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/
politics/prism-collection-documents/; Ryan Gallagher, National Security Agency Even
Spied on Google Maps Searches, Documents Suggest, SLATE (July 11, 2013), available athttp://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/2013/07/11/xkeyscore-program may-have-allowe
dNational Security Agency-to-spy on-google maps-searches.html; Barton Gellman &Todd Lindeman, Inner workings of a top-secret spy program, WASH. POST (June 29, 2013),
available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-sec
ret-spy-program/282/; Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, National Security Agency
Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec.4, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-
cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a.5cf2_lie3_
bc56-c6ca94801fac story.html; Ashkan Soltani & Matt DeLong, FASCIA The NationalSecurity Agency's huge trove of location records, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), available athttp://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/what-is.fascia/637/# document/pl/a135288.
10. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 29, In re Government's Exparte Submission
of Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Docket Number Redacted(FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011).
11. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1158-59 (2013).
12. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps into User Data
of Apple, Google, and Others, GUARDIAN 1 (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
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information and communication content. 3 Through PRISM, the
government has directly accessed email, chat, photos, stored data,
voice over IP, and other information stored on participating
companies' servers. 4 Although not explicitly a part of the PRISM
program, the NSA has also engaged in bulk phone record collection.
Most notably, in 2013, Verizon was asked to turn over phone
numbers, call durations, location data, and other customer
information for all of its customers on a daily basis, including
information about purely domestic calls. 6 These indirect surveillance
programs were conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act § 702, but their domestic focus and use in ordinary
domestic criminal prosecutions has caused alarm among civil
libertarians and the public.
17
2. Upstream Collection
The NSA has also been operating a program similar to PRISM
involving upstream collection of communications on AT&T's
network. 8 In one particular instance, the NSA installed a special
room at AT&T's Folsom Street Facility in San Francisco, where all
communications passing through the facility were "split," or
redirected through the special room, so that they could be collected
before reaching their destination.' 9 Upstream collection was not
limited to international communications or communications where
one party to the communication was located abroad.20 With this one
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN 1 (June 5, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; Secondary Order at 1-3,
In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for the Production of Tangible
Things from Verizon Business Network Services Inc. (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. BR
13-80).
16. Secondary Order at 2, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for
the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services Inc. (FISA
Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. BR 13-80).
17. Id. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2008).
18. Plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Evidence Section 1006 Summary of Voluminous
Evidence Filed in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition
to the Government Defendants' Cross-Motion at 4, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F.
Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 08-04373).
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
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facility, the NSA had access to 10% of all domestic internet
communications in the United States.2 '
3. XKeyscore
XKeyscore was one of the most far-reaching programs revealed
by the Snowden leaks. The XKeyscore program compiled the many
forms of content and metadata being mined by the NSA, such that a
full data and content dossier on any individual could be accessed with
the click of a button.22 "The purpose of XKeyscore is to allow
analysts to search the metadata as well as the content of emails and
other internet activity, such as browser history, even when there is no
known email account (a 'selector' in NSA parlance) associated with
the individual being targeted." 23 XKeyscore includes social media
activity and browsing data, which generally fall under the umbrella of
personal data, similar to that which is traded by data mining and
advertising agencies.
There is no doubt that the highly invasive programs conducted
by the National Security Agency are an invasion of privacy. While
conducting mass surveillance in the name of fighting international
terrorism-but for the purposes of domestic or ordinary criminal
prosecutions-is dishonest and disingenuous, it also poses a threat to
our criminal justice system. The risk and actual use of evidence
gathered pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
or Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") but in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, is serious.24
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects Nearly Everything a User Does
on the Internet, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/
world/ 2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
23. Id.
24. See Kathlyn Querubin, Cutting the Fourth Amendment Loose From Its Moorings:
The Unconstitutional Use of FISA Evidence in Ordinary Criminal Prosecutions, 37
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371, 394-97 (2010).
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H. A Failed Framework: FISA, ECPA, and the Fourth
Amendment Do Not Protect or Provide a Remedy
A. Domestic and International Surveillance Regulations Do Not Protect
the Public Because They Require Less Stringent Standards than the
Fourth Amendment
The National Security Agency's surveillance programs are
typically subject to either ECPA or FISA."5 Generally speaking,
ECPA applies to domestic electronic surveillance or investigation,
while FISA applies when the government is gathering intelligence on
foreign targets.26 These statutes purport to place limitations on
government surveillance. However, these statutes actually operate to
reduce the burden the government must satisfy in order to engage in
the type of investigation for the purposes of criminal prosecution
generally governed by the Fourth Amendment." Both statutes allow
the government to conduct, what I argue should constitute, searches
under the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of Fourth Amendment
requirements including probable cause or the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion and in the absence of a warrant.2" Law
enforcement should not be allowed to avoid the Fourth Amendment
through the use of FISA.29 While, in theory, these statutes regulate
government surveillance of electronic communications and personal
data, they provide little protection without compliance from agencies,
such as the National Security Agency.
25. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(2011); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811. See also
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264,1305 (2004).
26. Solove, supra note 25, at 1266.
27. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3, 4 (2007); Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Law in a Networked
World: Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 122
(2008); Querubin, supra note 24, at 372-74; Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann,
Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1234 (2003); William Pollak, Shu'ubiyya or Security? Preserving Civil Liberties by Limiting
FISA Evidence to National Security Prosecutions, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 221, 221-23
(2008).
28. Freiwald, supra note 27, at 4; Querubin, supra note 24, at 373.
29. Pollak, supra note 27, at 222-23.
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B. The Relevant Statues Fail to Protect the Public When Agencies
Exceed Their Authority Under the Statutes
In Jewel v. National Security Agency, a lawsuit filed by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), a putative class of plaintiffs
made up of AT&T customers sought legal and equitable relief for
violations of federal constitutional rights, FISA, and ECPA. ° They
alleged that the NSA, in cooperation with AT&T, engaged in the
collection of communications passing through AT&T's network at its
Folsom Street Facility without satisfying the FISA and ECPA
requirements of reasonable suspicion that the target is a foreign
power or agent and reasonable suspicion that the information is
relevant to a criminal investigation or to an investigation to protect
against international terrorism and spying.31 Many of the EFF's
allegations are supported by credible evidence and have been
admitted, to some extent, by the government.32 This lawsuit and other
lawsuits filed over the last five years demonstrate that, regardless of
the constitutionality of FISA or ECPA, FISA and ECPA provide
little protection for the public when the government refuses to adhere
to them.3
ECPA and FISA are supposed to limit the collection and use of
personal data and electronic communications.34  The National
Security Agency's mass surveillance programs, conducted pursuant to
ECPA and FISA, however, have swept up massive amounts of data
and content that would be ancillary to any individual application for a
wiretap. While this is a tremendous invasion of privacy, the crux of
the constitutional issue is that limits on the use of that data and
information have proven to be ineffective. So, not only is the NSA
abrogating its front end responsibilities and obligations under ECPA
and FISA in operation of its mass surveillance programs, the data and
content are in turn being improperly utilized in ordinary criminal
prosecutions without any fallback protection from the Fourth
30. Complaint for Constitutional and Statutory Violations, Seeking Damages,
Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief at 25-34, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d
1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 08-04373).
31. Id. at 13-14. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1)(A)-(C).
32. Plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Evidence Section 1006 Summary of Voluminous
Evidence Filed in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition
to the Government Defendants' Cross-Motion at 4, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F.
Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 08-04373).
33. See LIU, NOLAN & THOMPSON II, supra note 3, at 8 (reviewing several instances
of recent litigation over NSA surveillance).
34. See Querubin, supra note 24, at 372-74.
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Amendment. Failure to comply with FISA and the ECPA is what
makes the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence so critical. The
Fourth Amendment is the legal protection of last resort where
Congress's statutory protections have failed. It is the ultimate
backstop.35
C. The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Does Not
Adequately Protect the Rights and Interests of the Public Because it
Excludes Modern Means of Communication and Data Generated
Through the Use of Web-Based Applications
While the NSA continues to disregard statutes such as FISA and
ECPA, the public is left with little protection by way of the
Constitution as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. The
Constitution, which sets the floor for government behavior where
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated, provides almost no
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures or the use of
evidence illegally obtained by the NSA in criminal prosecutions.36
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.37
The text of the Fourth Amendment enumerates different
property items, the enumeration of which has given rise to a long-
standing property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment.38 As
early as 1886, the Court interpreted a search under the Fourth
Amendment as occurring when the government violated a property
interest, such as physical intrusion into the home or review of one's
35. See also Freiwald, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that the lack of a statutory
suppression remedy under the ECPA means that victims of illegal digital surveillance and
electronic eavesdropping can only obtain relief if they prevail on a claim of Fourth
Amendment violation).
36. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106-07
(2008); Freiwald, supra note 27.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38. Id.; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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personal documents.39 While the Court has explicitly refrained from
overruling this trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment, it is no
longer the only controlling doctrine.0
In Katz v. United States, the Court took steps to adopt a privacy-
based approach to the Fourth Amendment instead of a formalistic
property-based approach. In Katz, the majority, led by Justice
Stewart, held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not just
constitutionally protected areas, and accordingly, that a search takes
place where the government violates an individual's privacy. 2 The
Katz approach that the Court has adopted since rendering a decision
in the case is actually the approach articulated by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Katz.43 The often-cited rule as formulated by
Harlan, and adopted by the Court, states that a search occurs when
there is an intrusion upon an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Katz seems to be a reasonable
expansion of Fourth Amendment protection on its face; after all, it
sought to protect people as well as property. In attempting to
interpret a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court has faltered.
In Smith v. Maryland, a pen register, which is a device that
records the numbers dialed on a phone, was used to investigate
Michael Lee Smith for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.
Under Katz and its progeny, a person does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a third
party.' The Court held that the use of the pen register was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because Smith
39. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949
(quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)) ("Our law holds the property
of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon
his neighbour's ground, he must justify it by law.").
40. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-52 (holding that Katz v. United States was an addition to,
and not replacement of, Fourth Amendment protection of property).
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967).
42. Id. at 353.
43. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
46. Id. at 743-44. See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976) ("The
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government ... This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed.").
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did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he
dialed, as they were transmitted through a third party.47 Smith has
serious implications in the digital age. 8 The third party doctrine
eviscerates Fourth Amendment protection under Katz in the modern
age. Through one decision, the Court brought nearly all modern
methods and modes of communication outside the operation of the
Fourth Amendment.49 Through its holding in Smith v. Maryland, the
Court did not just refuse to extend Fourth Amendment protection in
one particular instance or create an exception. Smith made it such
that surveillance and investigation involving collection or review of
communications or data that have passed through an internet service
provider, a precondition satisfied anytime the internet is involved, do
not constitute searches. 0 As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her
concurrence in United States v. Jones, the third party doctrine is "ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks."51 Without a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data and communications collected by the NSA, the
alternative source of Fourth Amendment protection is the Court's
classic trespass theory. Absent congressional intervention in the form
of legislation vesting property rights in electronic communications
and personal information, the Court's trespass theory fails to provide
any protection either."
In United States v. Jones, law enforcement personnel, in the
course of a criminal investigation, placed a GPS tracking device in the
undercarriage of Antoine Jones's publicly parked car and tracked the
movements of the vehicle for four weeks. 3 The Fourth Amendment
provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."5 The term "effects," as used in the
Fourth Amendment, is understood to include automobiles.5 The
47. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
48. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
49. See 1 HALL, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.03 (2013).
50. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2013).
51. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Bedi, supra note 50, at 3.
52. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (articulating that modern
surveillance technologies no longer require a physical intrusion).
53. Id. at 947-48.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
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Court concluded that the placement of the GPS tracker in the
undercarriage of Mr. Jones's car constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment because an automobile, as an effect, is a
constitutionally protected entity, and the placement of the GPS
tracker was a physical intrusion into that constitutionally protected
area.
5 6
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court considered the
constitutionality of thermal imaging technology. 7 In that case, police
used a thermal imaging device not generally available to the public in
order to discern the presence of heat within the interior of the house
they were surveilling 8 The device the police used was capable of
detecting infrared radiation inside the house from all the way across
the street, such that the investigating officers did not even need to
leave their vehicle. 9 The Court held that the use of technology not
generally available to the public, such as the thermal imaging used by
the investigating officers, in order to ascertain intimate details of a
home not knowable without physical intrusion into the home
constituted a search.6°
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court once again considered a use of
novel technology under its trespass theory of the Fourth
Amendment.' In this case, police, on the basis of an uncorroborated
tip, went to the home of Joelies Jardines in order to look for evidence
of marijuana cultivation.6" They utilized a dog specially trained to
detect and alert to certain odors, including those of narcotics.6 The
police allowed the dog to walk near and around the door to Jardines's
home, where the dog gave an alert, which subsequently served as the
basis for a warrant to search the residence' Applying its trespass
theory, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the use of
the drug sniffing dog constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment because the dog intruded upon a constitutionally
56. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
57. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 40.
61. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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protected area, the curtilage, which is afforded the same protection as
the home itself.65
Jones, Kyllo, and Jardines are significant because they represent
instances of the Court applying its trespass theory in order to
determine the constitutionality of modern surveillance techniques
that are less physically intrusive. Jones is particularly significant
because it was recent. The Court has consistently stated that its
privacy approach under Katz was in addition to its trespass theory.'
Jones demonstrates, that while the Court has used Katz, it is more
comfortable applying the traditional trespass theory, even in 2012.67
While Jones is a recent example of the Court protecting Fourth
Amendment rights on the basis of its trespass theory, the Court has
not had much occasion to apply the trespass theory to the types of
electronic surveillance being conducted by the NSA. To be sure,
while Jones did involve technology, ultimately, the trespass doctrine
applied because it also involved the placement of a physical device on
a vehicle, which provided the Court with a way to tether the GPS
technology to its trespass theory.
The thermal imaging device considered by the Court in Kyllo is
the closest surveillance technique to the mass collection and review of
e-mails, text messages, browsing histories, and keystrokes the Court
has considered on the merits. 68 The Court's jurisprudence has not, up
to this point, provided any affirmative protection of electronic
communications and personal data under its trespass theory. It is
unclear whether or not the Court would extend its trespass
jurisprudence to instances of police investigation that did not involve
some sort of literal physical intrusion, as in Jones, or effective physical
intrusion of the home specifically, as in Kyllo.69 Vesting property
rights in personal data and electronic communications will provide
the Court with a tangible foundation for applying its trespass theory.
65. Id. at 1416-18.
66. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-52 (holding that Katz was an addition to, and not
replacement of, Fourth Amendment protection of property).
67. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MIcH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004).
68. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30 (describing sense-enhancing technology used to
assess infrared radiation at the residence of Petitioner, Danny Kyllo).
69. See Dow Chem. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-38 (1986) (holding that the
space surrounding commercial buildings are neither analogous to nor entitled to the same
protection as the curtilage of a home or dwelling).
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IH. A Property-Based Framework under the
Fourth Amendment
A. Vesting Property Rights in Personal Data and Electronic
Communications Will Facilitate a Fair Marketplace and
Fourth Amendment Protection
Since the proliferation of personal computing and the internet,
scholars, economists, and public advocates have discussed the merits
of granting individuals property rights in their personal data and
virtual identification information."0 Much of the discussion over
vesting property rights in personal data has concerned promoting
privacy and creating a fair and efficient marketplace for personal
data."1 From the perspective of many economists, there is currently a
market failure occurring in the marketplace for personal data.72
While firms that use and sell personal data take advantage of the full
benefit of trading in such data, they bear none of the costs, costs that
are externalized and borne out by consumers whose data is
overexposed without their knowledge or consent.73 Some argue that
granting individuals property rights in their personal data will
empower them to engage in the bargaining necessary to protect their
privacy and to hold firms trading consumer data to a reasonable
standard governing the dissemination, disclosure, and sale of such
information and data.74 In addition to these positive outcomes,
granting individuals property rights in their personal data will also
facilitate the protection of Fourth Amendment rights. As I will
discuss, property rights will facilitate judicial application of the
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment. However, property rights,
or a licensing scheme such as the one advocated for by Pamela
Samuelson, could also open the door to reform of the third party
doctrine.
70. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy: Privacy Regulation in National
Networks, 39 COMM. OF THE ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACH. 92, 93 (1996); Patricia Mell,
Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic
Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 74-78 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1132.
71. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1128; Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in
Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996).
72. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1127-28.
73. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8
(1998). See also Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1128, 1132-33.
74. Laudon, supra note 70, at 93; Murphy, supra note 71, at 2406.
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Scholars advocating for a more equitable marketplace for
personal data have articulated that fortifying individuals' rights to
personal data will facilitate a system where individuals can choose to
maintain the privacy of their information or disclose it as they see fit.75
The bargaining that will take place in a licensing or property-based
scheme will serve as evidence of whether or not an individual
intended to maintain the confidentiality of his or her information, or
more specifically, the precise terms of their disclosure to a third party.
The presence of bargaining and the terms of disclosure could serve as
a factual basis for the Court to conduct a more reasonable evaluation
of the degree to which information has been exposed to the public. It
would be untenable for the Court to continue to hold that third party
disclosure is public information where consumers have the ability to
not only opt for confidentiality, but to prescribe the terms of use and
disclosure of their personal information. Rather than try to interpret
expectations of privacy, the Court would have the capability to look
to actual agreements between the parties. Property rights in personal
data may have the side effect of facilitating a more coherent analysis
under Katz and Smith v. Maryland; however, a return to a trespass
theory of the Fourth Amendment is still preferable. While
rehabilitating the third party doctrine would require a Court that was
actually willing to revisit the doctrine and deviate from stare decisis in
a substantial number of cases, there is a workable way for the Court
to apply its existing trespass jurisprudence.
Vesting property rights will provide the Supreme Court with the
necessary property interest to anchor its trespass theory of the Fourth
Amendment. Smith v. Maryland removed personal data and
electronic communications from the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, but a concrete property right will bring that content and
information back within the operation of the Fourth Amendment.76
Giving individuals property rights in their personal data and
electronic communications renders what was once intangible and
outside the scope of the trespass theory tangible and concrete, such
that a trespass theory can properly be applied both in law and in fact.
The Court has demonstrated its willingness to maintain and apply its
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment in instances where there is
a physical and tangible way to tie that theory to the facts of the case."When individuals have ownership of their personal data and
75. Laudon, supra note 70, at 93; Mell, supra note 70, at 79.
76. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
77. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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electronic communications, they will have the power to truly control
the disclosure and use of that information and will provide the Court
with a clear way to examine instances of police investigation and
surveillance. Where there are property rights in personal data and
electronic communications, the Court has the ability to look at the
alienation of that information and content as a property right rather
than trying to analyze the degree to which information has been
exposed when disclosed to one party.
In contrast to the eviscerated Fourth Amendment protection
under Katz as interpreted in Smith v. Maryland, the trespass theory of
the Fourth Amendment as applied to personal data and electronic
communications provides significantly more protection. This is
principally because under a trespass theory, the Court looks at the
steps taken to protect the property from prying eyes, rather than
presuming public disclosure where there has been disclosure to even
one third party."8 As early as 1886, the Court recognized the common
law definition of curtilage as an area closely tied to the "sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."' 9 Later, the Court elaborated
on this concept by holding that the curtilage is an extension of the
home where intimate activities may transpire, such that the curtilage
is considered to be part of the home itself under the Fourth
Amendment. °
In contrast to the protected curtilage area are open fields, which
are considered to be public.81 In Hester v. United States, a prohibition
era case, the police obtained evidence that the defendant had
moonshine when a jug and bottle that had been discarded in hot
pursuit were found outside of the defendant's home.82 The Court held
that the Fourth Amendment protections that applied to the
enumerated categories of persons, houses, papers, and effects did not
apply to open fields, or unenclosed areas away from the entrance to
the home.83 Hester allows police to enter and investigate an open field
78. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (holding there are four factors to
consider in order to determine the curtilage of a home); Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (holding
no expectation of privacy in information disclosed to third party).
79. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
80. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,180 (1984).
81. Id. at 171.
82. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57 (1924).
83. Id. at 59.
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because doing so is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. '
Personal data and electronic communications, such as the bulk
collected by the NSA, are an extension of the individual and the
home, and should be protected as such.8" Like the activities that may
take place in the curtilage of a home, personal data and electronic
communications are closely tied to the privacies of life or intimate
activities that are traditionally associated with the home.86  An
individual's search history, key strokes, personal data, and electronic
communications and documents are all intimate activities, like those
activities the Court is concerned with protecting under the Fourth
Amendment. Intimate details of a person's life, all which may have
had a concrete existence in a home during eras past now exist in
virtual form. Financial information, communications between
individuals and their closest friends and family, book, music, and
movie collections are often stored on hard memory or in web-based
applications such as TurboTax, Google, or iCloud. While the physical
form of intimate activities and information associated with the home
may have changed, these activities and information are conceptually
the same and deserve continued protection under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Court has held that what separates the curtilage from public
space or vantage points are an individual's attempts to protect the
area and prevent trespass.87 There are four factors the Court
considers when determining whether or not to protect any area as
part of the curtilage of the home.88 The Court looks at the proximity
between the area claimed as curtilage and the home, whether or not
the claimed area is enclosed or fenced in, how the claimed area is
used, and whether or not steps have been taken to protect the
claimed area from observation by the public.8 While in a real
property context, these factors recognize the curtilage as an area
immediately surrounding the home that is enclosed by fences or
84. Oliver, 496 U.S. at 171.
85. "But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.
At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414
(quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511).
86. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (describing personal routines, such as the time one takes
a bath or sauna, as intimate details).
87. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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barriers, used for intimate activities, and protected by "no
trespassing" signs or other measures to discourage public viewing,
these same factors can be easily applied to personal data and
electronic communications as well.
The first three factors of the Court's curtilage analysis go hand-
in-hand. Posting publicly on a forum or blog generates content and
data, but does so in the open and in a manner that is distant from
one's metaphorical home on the internet. Additionally, posting in
open forums means that the information and data generated by the
posting are not walled off from the rest of the internet, and also, that
the posting is not of a particularly intimate nature; otherwise it likely
would not have been placed into the open web. In contrast, banking
online or using online tax preparation or investment applications is
closer in proximity to one's internet home. Financial information is
quite intimate and would likely be maintained within the home itself.
Additionally, the sort of web-based applications that are used to
handle financial information are not like an open field, or its internet
equivalent, an online forum. Instead, they are walled off, and data
entered into such web-based applications is enclosed within the
application, and typically encrypted, such that it is walled off from the
rest of the internet.
Applying the fourth factor, it is very clear that individuals take
steps to protect their information on the internet just as individuals
might fence off real property and take steps to prevent the public or
passersby from viewing the curtilage of their homes. The use of
privacy settings, screen names, and passwords are all steps taken to
protect the intimate details of an individual's internet activities and
electronic communications. Additionally, private browsing, do-not-
track settings, and alternatives to traditional internet browsing, such
as Tor have developed to allow people to shield their intimate
internet activities and browsing histories from the world.9 Where an
individual has not taken advantage of measures to protect his or her
privacy and where that data or communication, perhaps in the form
of a public Facebook post, has been placed into the open internet, the
high degree of protection provided to the home and the curtilage
90. Alex Fowler, Congratulations, Chrome Users, MOZILLA PRIVACY BLOG (Sep.
14, 2012), https:/Iblog.mozilla.org/privacy/2012/09/14/congratulations-chrome-users/. See
also Stuart Dredge, What is Tor? A Beginner's Guide to the Privacy Tool, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/tor-
beginners-guide-nsa-browser.
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should not be extended, as it is effectively information in an "open
field."'"
Applying the four factor curtilage test to the mass surveillance
programs being operated by the NSA, the majority of the information
being gathered, such as the content of electronic communications as
well as information gained through bypassing password protection
and directly accessing internet service provider and web-based
application servers, would at the very least be subject to the Fourth
Amendment where individuals have an actual property interest in
that personal data and content. Where the NSA went around a
firewall or password protection, or otherwise trespassed upon that
electronic property, a physical intrusion will have taken place, which
is a search under the Fourth Amendment. 2
Where an individual has disclosed information to a third party,
Fourth Amendment protection will not be completely eviscerated, at
least under a trespass theory. While privacy policies represent an
analog to agreements over the use of personal data and electronic
communications as property, the Court has not treated them with the
same degree of reverence. 93 Providing an internet service provider
with information may nullify a privacy interest in that information,
but disclosure of information would not nullify a property interest,
rather, such a disclosure would be an exercise of the property owner's
right to alienate the property.94 Disclosure of information to which an
individual has a property interest is akin to a bailment, which may be
limited by certain terms and conditions, but unlike a privacy interest
under Smith v. Maryland, a property interest is not extinguished by an
act of bailment or tenancy alone.95
There are several other ways that personal data and electronic
communications would receive more protection under a property-
based analysis under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
has held that vehicles and other miscellaneous personal belongings
constitute effects for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.96
Establishing property rights in personal data would render data
personal property properly considered an effect, which is
91. See Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
92. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
93. See ACLU v. Clapper, 659 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-51 (2013) (upholding the third
party doctrine).
94. See 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 1 (2014).
95. Id.
96. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
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constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment. Similarly,
e-mail would properly be considered papers, which are an
enumerated category of constitutionally protected property.97 The
creation of property rights in personal data and electronic
information including social media activity, browsing history, and
other metadata collected by the National Security Agency would not
necessarily dispose of the constitutionality of those practices. The
constitutionality of FISA, ECPA, and electronic surveillance
conducted pursuant to those statutes is an entirely separate matter;
however, it would at least subject such surveillance to the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment. While e-mail and personal data would not
be protected under a Katz theory due to the third party doctrine, they
would be properly protected as papers and effects under the Court's
longstanding trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment if a property
right were to be created and vested.98
B. The Court Can Easily Apply Its Current Jurisprudence to Vested
Property Rights in Personal Data and Electronic Communications
The ease with which the Court's existing trespass jurisprudence
can be applied to personal data and electronic communications
demonstrates that vesting property rights in those intangibles in order
to facilitate application of the trespass theory will provide more
Fourth Amendment protection. Analyzing surveillance of e-mail and
other electronic communications under a trespass theory would be
novel in the criminal context, but not in the civil context, which
further demonstrates the ease by which the Court could apply its
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment to electronic
communications and personal effects.99 A return to a property basis is
valuable for additional reasons, however.
C. Property Law Concepts More Accurately Represent Public
Conceptions of Electronic Communications, Personal Data, and
Other Intangible Internet-Based Information
Property law is a good fit for electronic communications and
personal data for several reasons. First of all, people conceive of their
97. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 654 (1980).
98. See Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment
Protections for E-mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 813-14 (2012) (identifying the third
party doctrine's impact on Fourth Amendment protection of email).
99. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass
Actions to Electronic Communications, 107 A.L.R 549 (2003).
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emails and personal data as property) ° Like tangible personal
effects, individuals generally have the right to exclude others from
accessing their digital communications and personal data, even when
it is in the custody of a third party, such as a hospital or financial
institution.''
Harmony between the law and public expectations of what the
law should be is important for the integrity of the Fourth
Amendment, the courts, and our judicial system. As Lon Fuller
articulated in his famous book, The Morality of Law, there is a
reciprocal relationship between the government and the public, and
where the public does not feel the laws are just or that the
government will honor them, the citizen's fidelity to the law will be
tested.' 2 If people conceive of their personal data and electronic
communications as property, then a congruent legal framework
would vest individuals with property rights in that content, or as
Patricia Mell describes it, their "electronic persona.'0.3
Paradoxically, while individuals may conceive of their personal
data and electronic communication as property, the ability to restrict
access and the disclosure restrictions and procedures imposed upon
third parties in possession of such personal information are largely
rooted in concepts of privacy, not property.' 4
D. Alternatively, Courts Can Seamlessly Extend the Existing Trespass
Theory of the Fourth Amendment Without Additional
Congressional Intervention or Upheaval of Established Precedent
Alternatively, absent congressional intervention through the
creation of property rights, the Court could extend its trespass theory
of the Fourth Amendment as established in Kyllo Kyllo is an
example of the Court extending its trespass doctrine to a case where
there was not necessarily a literal physical intrusion, but rather, where
the use of technology effected a physical intrusion."° It would not be
much more of a stretch for the Court to apply its holding to the NSA
programs that came to light in 2012. PRISM, XKeyscore, and
upstream collection programs utilize technology, as well as
100. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1130.
101. Id.
102. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39-41 (rev. ed. 1969)
103. See Mell, supra note 70.
104. Samuelson, supra note 70, at 1131.
105. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
106. Id.
[Vol. 42:3
Spring 2015] NEW DATA MARKETPLACE 597
knowledge, that is not generally available to the public. Certainly
some highly skilled individuals may have the ability to obtain the
same information as the NSA through hacking or other unauthorized
means of accessing information held by internet service providers and
telecommunications companies. The ability of a few is not the same
as widespread availability of a specific skill or technology.
Additionally, the fact that these programs and surveillance methods
have been classified and kept secret for so long further demonstrates
that these technologies are not widely available to the general public,
and are more analogous to the sense-enhancing technology used in
Kyllo than mere public observation by law enforcement. 7
As in Kyllo, the NSA's surveillance programs collect information
not generally available to the public.'9 Additionally, the information
that is collected likely could not be collected without virtual intrusion,
or trespass, upon property rights vested in personal data and
electronic communications'9 With PRISM, the NSA had to request
access to the servers of large tech companies in order to gain access to
the data and content they sought."0 The general public does not have
access to these servers and does not have the ability to compile the
quantity and quality of data that is being compiled through the
XKeyscore program."' In this way, modern surveillance is just like
Kyllo. The government is using sophisticated technologies to access
intimate information about the public that they would not otherwise
have access to if it were not for their use of the sophisticated, or
sense-enhancing, technologies.
IV. A Trespass Approach to the Fourth Amendment is
Preferable to Katz and Any Attempts to Reform a Privacy-
Based Theory of the Fourth Amendment
Criticism of the third party doctrine among scholars and legal
practitioners is nothing new.' Since the original revelation of the
government's warrantless wiretapping programs there has been a
flurry of scholarship declaring the end of privacy and examining
107. See supra note 2.
108. See supra notes 12, 15-16, 22 (detailing electronic communications content and
metadata collected by NSA).
109. Id.
110. Supra notes 12-17 (explaining the mechanics of the PRISM program).
111. Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 22.
112. James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 681 (1985).
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reasonable expectations of privacy under Katz.'13 Privacy theory and
jurisprudence is en vogue right now, but it will never provide as
satisfactory of a solution to what ails the Fourth Amendment as a
trespass theory."' This is because the Katz doctrine was not a
workable standard to begin with."5  The only way that Katz, a
judicially created standard, can be rehabilitated, is if the Court, of its
own volition, chooses to explicitly or implicitly overturn precedent
such as Smith v. Maryland."6 To square the reasonable expectations
of privacy in various scenarios with the public's actual expectations of
privacy in the digital age would require the Court to hear and decide
many cases, some of which have not even begun to wind their way
through the courts, and could never wind their way through the courts
at the same rate of ever-evolving technology. Ultimately, Katz should
not be rehabilitated because it was not a workable doctrine to begin
with.
First, the Court is in a poor position to determine what privacy
expectations society is prepared to recognize as legitimate."7 Progress
has been made in diversifying the bench, but Supreme Court justices
still come from a particularly privileged segment of society and apply
precedent crafted over hundreds of years by an even less diverse
bench."8 Of the current justices, all nine attended Ivy League law
schools, primarily Harvard and Yale."9 The continued existence of an
Ivy League track to the judiciary ensures that the justices are not
from backgrounds or currently in positions that allow them to truly
understand what the public and everyday Americans, Justice Harlan's
113. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 36, at 106-07.
114. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1047-51 (1995).
115. "The problem with the reasonable expectation of privacy test in the
communications context is not that it requires judicial discretion, but that it requires both
a positive and normative inquiry that challenges courts' competence. Moreover, the test,
as courts currently interpret it, misplaces the focus onto what the target knew or should've
known instead of on the intrusive nature of the surveillance itself." Freiwald, supra note
27, at 21.
116. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
117. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1389, 1411-12 (2012) (arguing reasonable expectations of privacy preference the
wealthy and landowners).
118. See Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for
the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 587, 587-89 (2011).
119. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
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"society," consider reasonable.' Additionally, the method of
determining a reasonable expectation of privacy is subject to wide
variation depending on the methodology used to calculate it.'' The
NSA mass surveillance programs are now public knowledge, so it
would be technically unreasonable for the public to maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal data and
electronic communications. Clearly, applying the standard in that
way would result in an untenable and absurd result. Nonetheless,
that is the very logic that animates the Court's original collapsing of
the concepts of secrecy and privacy in Smith v. Maryland.'22
Second, a privacy theory lacks the sort of widespread support
across the bench. A successful theory of the Fourth Amendment
must appeal to the most conservative common denominator, Justice
Scalia. Trespass, as a doctrine, is rooted in the common law and text
of the Constitution, which makes it an appealing theory to textualists,
originalists, and progressives alike.'"
V. A Return to the Trespass Theory of the Fourth Amendment
Will Restore the Fourth Amendment, Protect the Public, and
Increase Faith in Public Institutions
In an era of intrusive domestic surveillance, the Fourth
Amendment must be moored in functioning doctrine. The privacy-
based theory of the Fourth Amendment as articulated in Katz is
beyond repair in the digital age. Rather, a more effective way to
protect the constitutional rights and privacy of the American public is
to vest Americans with property rights in their personal data and
electronic communications. Property rights will form the missing link
between the Court's jurisprudence and the expectations of the public.
Vesting property rights will transform individuals' legitimate
expectations of privacy, which the Court has overlooked, into a
tangible form, property rights, which are more easily cognizable by
the law and the Court."' Property rights in data, including virtual
identification information are necessary beyond the context of a fair
and efficient marketplace for consumer data, they are necessary to
120. See Freiwald, supra note 27, at 8.
121. Rubenfeld, supra note 36, at 107-08; Kerr, supra note 67, at 808.
122. Tomkovicz, supra note 112, at 681.
123. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 786 (1994) (describing origins of trespass in the context of the Fourth Amendment).
124. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information disclosed to third party).
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preserve the privacy and Fourth Amendment rights of Americans.
Unlike the Court's reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment has withstood the test of
time and has been applied to some modern technologies.125  By
vesting property rights in personal data and electronic
communications, the courts will have a legal foundation on which to
apply a trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the legitimacy of the Fourth Amendment and of
the judicial system will increase because creating legal ownership of
personal data and electronic communications will more accurately
reflect the public's sense of ownership and expectations about the use
of their data and the internet in general. The legitimacy of our
judicial system and the Constitution are inherently important;
however, increased legitimacy and respect for these legal institutions
will actually benefit the government as well as the public. Although I
do not propose, as a matter of policy, that the government continue
these programs, their proponents would be wise to support increased
Fourth Amendment protections. When members of the public trust
the government and view the legal institutions designed to protect
them as legitimate, there will be less public outcry and resistance to
the very surveillance programs the government seeks to operate to
increase national security. By following regulations such as the
ECPA and FISA, and operating in a manner that is transparent and
legal, the government will be able to maintain its programs, if it so
chooses, with less public ire and resistance.
125. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
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